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Chapter Four: Two decades of liberalization reforms in Morocco: 
Successes and failures. 
 
Aouatif El Fakir1. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The declared objective of the liberalization reforms during the 1980s and the 1990s was to 
accelerate the transformation of pre-capitalist developing economies into “modern” market 
economies. With this objective in mind, International agencies and donors  promoted policies 
to confine the State to service-delivery and to integrate these economies in the global trade. 
After more than two decades, however, developing countries that implemented these reforms 
are still dependant on a conjuncture of external factors and their growth rate remains stunted. 
Furthermore, the increasing openness of their markets, as illustrated by the larger percentage 
of merchandise trade in GDP (gross domestic product), had little impact on income and 
investment. During the 1980s and the 1990s, gross capital formation in Mexico, Morocco, 
Argentina or Tunisia was reduced (World Bank database http://www.worldbank.org/). 
Growth in income per person fluctuated without paralleling trade trend. These questions we 
are trying to answer are: Why did the liberalization reforms fail to make national markets 
more efficient and private sector more active? Why did not these reforms increase 
investments, growth and welfare, as the liberalization theories had predicted? 
In this paper, we try to answer these questions for the case of Morocco by focusing on 
sustainable competitiveness and growth. We assess the effects of reforms on the country’s 
capability to design and manufacture competitive products and processes taking advantage of 
technologies, whether imported or domestic. In other words, we evaluate the consequences of 
the reforms with respect to: i)  the emergence of an institutional framework for economic 
take-off and ii) technological learning.  
 
Our point of view is that an actual economic take-off of developing countries occurs when 
companies are able to improve their competitiveness through the technological learning. 
Without such learning, firms will not be able to use imported technologies efficiently, to 
expand production capability or innovate on the basis of their own research and development 
(R&D) efforts.  
 
In Section 2, we expose the theoretical background and the analytical framework of our 
research. In Section 3, we use this framework to examine the liberalization reforms and 
discuss their outcome in terms of technological learning. We outline in Section 4 some 
recommendations leading to sustainable competitiveness and effective take-off. 
 
 
II. TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE: 
 
The competitiveness and the growth of companies, industries and countries depend on their 
capability to meet demands in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness. Viotti (2003) calls 
this capability ‘technological capability’ and defines it as ‘managerial and technical skills and 
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know-how that allow to manufacture products and processes and to change incrementally or 
radically their design or performances’. Lall (2001) distinguishes 4 levels of technological 
capabilities. As we can see in Figure 2.1, basic capabilities enable firms to use imported 
technology efficiently; duplicative capabilities enable them to use some technology elements 
to expand production; adaptive capabilities enable them to adapt and improve foreign 
technologies and to carry out complex engineering and innovative capabilities lead to develop 
new technologies. 
 
Figure 2.1: The pyramid of technological capabilities according Lall (2001). 
Basic manufacturing capabilities to use technology efficiently.
Duplicative Capabilities To expand capacity
and purchase and integrate Foreign technologies.
Adaptive capabilities to adapt
and improve imported technologies, 
Design capabilities for more complex learning.
Innovative
capabilities based
on R&D To 
keep pace with 
Technological frontiers.
 
 
In theory, policies and strategies are designed and implemented to guarantee the acquisition of 
the needed technological capabilities for each stage, what we call here the “technological 
learning”. In practice, however, some companies (or countries) improve their capabilities 
while others stagnate. Scholars of the development process have tried to explain this 
difference and especially the stagnation of some developing countries. Sen (1975) considers 
that the failures of the market have lead to the transfer of inappropriate technologies. That is, 
some imported technologies are labor-saving even with an abundant workforce. According to 
Helleiner (1975), the solution is to make information on technology available, enhance the 
bargaining power, limit suppliers’ influence and have a consensus about national policies. On 
the other hand, studies of successful technology transfers show that it is crucial to have a 
threshold of skills and knowledge to use, adapt or improve imported technologies (Lall 1993, 
Bell and Pavitt 1993). In addition, Perez and Soete (1988) have shown that it is essential that 
the combinations of infrastructure, knowledge, skills and externalities available match the 
different stages of technologies and paradigms. Pack and Saggi (1997) explain that 
technology transfers and domestic R&D are complementary in the beginning of the 
development process and end-up by competing at the top of the pyramid of technological 
capabilities. Others consider that domestic R&D system is the best tool to resolve domestic 
problems and satisfy domestic demand. (Sagasti 2004,).  
 
On the basis of national systems of innovation (NSI) approach, Arocena and Sutz (2000) 
argue that developing countries stagnate because of the lack of interactive learning spaces 
(ILSs). These are interactive activities and processes where individuals and organizations 
generate, exchange and use knowledge to enhance their ability to learn and to resolve 
problems in a systematic way. For instance, without an ILS involving a domestic company 
and a technology’s supplier (through training and technical assistance), the former cannot 
acquire basic manufacturing capabilities. If the company does not interact with its clients, it 
cannot identify which product features to upgrade and thus cannot acquire adaptive 
capabilities. Finally, if the company does not interact with public research structures or 
universities, innovation process can be longer and more difficult.  
Studies of industrialized countries show that the acquisition and the upgrading of 
technological capabilities depends on specialized institutions and on the co-evolution of 
technologies, institutions and organizations1 (Freeman and Soete 1997; Nelson, 1993, 
Lundvall, 1992). Formal institutions (property rights system, tax system) and informal 
institutions (habits, norms of cooperation) regulate relationships between individuals and 
groups and supports int eractions, learning and innovations (Edquist 1997). Moreover, these 
studies point out the crucial role of the State that enforced formal institutions and encouraged 
informal institutions in order to perform technological learning. In addition, Governments 
turned learning toward specific areas through policies and procurement. 
 
The role of the State is actually the subject for debate between two views. The dominant 
liberal-market consensus confines the State to service-delivery whereas the ‘social 
transformation model looks at the role of the State on the context of the transition to 
capitalism’. (Khan 2006). The first view asserts that by achieving markets effectiveness, 
protecting property rights, fighting corruption and enhancing democratization and 
accountability, the State guarantees automatically growth and welfare. The liberal-market 
consensus, based on new classical economics and new institutional economics, is still 
underpinning plans, reforms and recommendations of international agencies and donors re 
garding developing countries as International Monterey Fund, World Bank or European 
Union. Paradoxically, the current financial crisis re-establishes the intervention of the State to 
save institutions even among the proponents of free markets. 
The social transformation model argues that development process is a transformation 
of pre-capitalist economies into advanced capitalist ones.  Regarding technology development 
in particular, Lall and Teubal (1998) observe that, in developing countries, the basis of 
technological knowledge internal to firms is relatively weak and that the supporting network 
of outside enterprises, institutions and human capital is underdeveloped.  As a result, 
technological learning is costly and risky. They argue that governments must establish 
institutions and policies for setting national priorities for industrial and technological 
development and providing incentives to economic agents for prior activities where more 
externalities are generated than others and where markets fail to do so adequately. As Khan 
(2002) sums up, the capability of the State to enforce effectively institutions and policies with 
low costs enable capitalists to emerge and technological learning to take place. 
The comparative study of some emergent countries achieved by Dahlman and Nelson (1995) 
shows that the macroeconomic environment and incentives regime determine technological 
and economic take-off. Appropriate human capital, foreign technologies, industrial 
infrastructure, public support and funding are crucial for the acquisition of technological 
capabilities. Other studies point out the crucial role of Governments in providing resources, 
setting up incentives, anticipating needs and coordinating actors. For instance, the South 
Korean government invested in infrastructure and education, promoted large domestic firms 
(the Chaebols), provided direct funding and subsidies to them, intervened in bargaining with 
foreign suppliers and set up tax incentives and protection to encourage technological learning. 
(El Fakir 2008).  
In the same way, the Chinese government swapped technology for market in strategic 
industries to support technological learning of domestic firms in mobile phone industry. 
China pressed the foreign firms to transfer their knowledge to domestic ones and allowed the 
domestic companies to improve their products through restricting indirectly the domestic 
market access to foreign companies. Chinese firms improved their competitiveness in their 
local markets very quickly before engaging in a harder contest on a global level (El Fakir 
2007, Von Zedtwitz and Jin 2007). The Indian government restricted foreign investments 
flows in strategic industries to strengthen indigenous technological capabilities. Following a 
controlled opening of the economy, many large Indian companies are now able to compete on 
global markets thanks to technological learning, human capital and know-how accumulation 
(Lall 1987). Similarly, the Singaporean government stimulated  strongly specialized high-
skill/high-tech industries for export markets by attracting transnational companies (TNCs) 
into high value-added activities. The Taiwanese government protected and subsidized capital, 
skill and technology intensive industry, set up incentives for exports of more advanced 
products and provided intense support for local R&D and upgrading of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). All of these countries did not follow the liberal-market consensus. It is 
acknowledged that many of these countries are still witnessing large corruption, rent-seeking 
behavior, weak property rights and lack of accountability. 
On the basis of previous works and studies, we assume here that the technological 
learning is the way to achieve sustainable growth and economic take-off in developing 
countries. This learning depends on ILSs that emerge at the enterprise level: within companies 
or between companies and other actors (suppliers, clients, universities, services providers, 
competitors and so on). Learning could be intra-organizational, inter-organizational or both. 
ILSs cannot emerge if there are no incentives and pressures on the firms to be more 
competitive and if they do not have required resources. We assume also that the role of the 
State is to establish an institutional framework providing resources and incentives and 
exerting pressures and compulsions in order to stimulate the acquisition of technological 
capabilities. 
Next, we analyze the impact of liberalization reforms on the acquisition of technological 
capabilities in Morocco. We examine how these reforms influenced the role of the State and 
thus the institutional framework and how they stimulated or prevented the emergence and the 
evolution of interactive learning spaces. On the one hand, we examine how the liberalization 
reforms were put into practices, to what extent they influenced the State capability to 
intervene and which institutional framework were set up. On the other hand, we assess the 
technological learning of Moroccan companies during two decades of reforms. This 
assessment is based on survey of a sample of large Moroccan companies in the most 
important industries. We discuss the effective outcome of reforms in terms of technological 
learning, competitiveness and growth. 
 
 
III. IMPACT OF REFORMS ON ROLE OF THE STATE & TECHNOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITIES 
 
 
In the 1970s, Morocco, as many other developing countries, was encouraged to increase its 
external debt. However, after the second oil crisis and when the US Federal Reserve raised its 
interest rate to reduce inflation in the beginning of the 1980s, Morocco could not pay back its 
debts. The decline in the price of phosphate and the jump of the price of petrol worsened 
Moroccan imbalances. The first attempt to bring the deficit under control by reducing demand 
led to the Casablanca bloody events in 20-22 June 1981, after the suppression of subsidies on 
of subsistence goods by the government. Morocco then entered in negotiations with the Paris 
and London Clubs
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 to reschedule its debts and was forced to accept a stabilization program in 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1983.  A structural adjustment 
program (SAP) in cooperation with the World Bank (WB) followed in 1984-1985 with the 
aim of reducing deficit, tame inflation and improve market efficiency (Morrisson 1991). The 
1990s witnessed the Good governance agenda, which aimed to perform economic and 
political reforms at the same time. 
 
Reforms implementation:  
In the 1980s, the financial support of the IMF and the WB was assured provided that the 
Moroccan government: 
Reduced the budget deficit by cutting investment and operating expenditures; 
Controlled inflation by reducing demand; 
Transferred the economic power to the private sector by privatizing public companies and 
reducing State intervention;  
Took steps to integrating the Moroccan economy into the global economy by deregulating 
protected sectors, opening domestic markets to foreign goods and capital and promoted 
exports on the basis of comparative advantages in commodity, low technology and labor 
intensive industries (Morrisson 1991). 
In the 1990s, the good governance agenda, on the basis of new institutional 
economics, “re-habilitated” partially the role of the State in economic and social life.  There 
are many definitions of Good governance, we quote here the most known and used. For 
OECD, it ‘encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which 
economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled’ (www.oecd.org/dac/). For the World Bank, good 
governance ‘epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy 
imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of 
law’(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNA
REGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~th
eSitePK:497024,00.html). The European Commission defined the concept of governance, as 
‘the capacity for a State to serve its citizens’ (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf). 
In addition to increasing market openness and supporting existing comparative 
advantages; the agenda argued that, in developing countries, transaction costs could be high 
not only because of State intervention but also because it is difficult to enforce the property 
rights and contracts. Therefore, it added the topics of property rights protection, fight against 
corruption, accountability, democratization, the rule of law and services delivery to the poor 
(Khan 2006). Economic, political and institutional reforms had to be performed 
simultaneously.  
During this decade, Moroccan government accelerated the privatization and started to 
remove the market protections. Morocco took advantage of € 27,6 millions to modernize its 
judiciary system and € 85 millions to reform its administration.  
 
The impact of reforms on the role of the State: unproductive bias: 
 
The SAP and good governance agenda were based on the liberal-market consensus. Thus, 
they imposed markets supremacy in terms of resources allocation, confined States to service-
delivery and advocate the integration of developing countries in the global production chain 
according to the theory of comparative advantages. 
In Morocco, the reforms led to the reduction of budget deficit and inflation. From 
1983 to 1988, the budget deficit decreased progressively thanks to significant reduction of 
investment expenditures. The inflation dropped from 7 percent by the end of the 1980s to 2 
percent by 2000 and total debt service declined monotonously from 35 percent in 1985 to 11 
percent in 2005 except the peak of 33 percent in 1995  (World Bank database 
http://www.worldbank.org/). The stabilization program led to a rise of foreign currencies 
reserves so that Morocco could reimburse the WB loan. The Moroccan government also 
learned how to achieve budget discipline and maintain national accounts in balance as much 
as possible.  These two aspects made the macroeconomic environment more stable and more 
attractive for investors.  
One of the negative aspects of the downsizing of the State is that it created a vacuum 
in many areas, including industrial planning and long-term development strategies. Today, 
these are designed according to the international lenders’ or private consulting firms’ advice 
and following “best practices” that do not necessarily match the context of the Moroccan 
economy. At the end of the 1990s, the best practices suggested to setting up many incentives 
to increase private R&D expenditures, while most companies did not have the necessary 
capabilities to conduct R&D. Furthermore, the government could not direct private 
investments towards industries/technologies that could provide sustainable growth prospects 
and time to learn. As the Moroccan State transferred strategic industries to private 
entrepreneurs (domestic and foreign), companies followed the rational course for the short-
term profit rather than upgrade their technological capabilities. For instance, Morocco’s 
entrepreneurs took advantage of garment quotas for European market to export cheap and low 
value-added products. As a result, private expenditures account for 12 percent of gross R&D 
expenditures which accounts for 0,8 percent of GDP in the late 1990s. Finally, in the 2000s, 
the government launched the “Emergence” plan to support specific industries that account for 
the future of Morocco such as the Offshoring or Aeronautics. But, a closer look at this plan 
shows that it actually supports a new kind of sub-contracting by private or foreign investors in 
search for cheaper labour and seeking short-term profitability. 
Despite the implementation of the good governance agenda, corruption and rent-seeking 
networks are still operating: 
The actors do not trust each other or the impartiality of the courts. In 2006, Morocco 
ranked 53rd in terms of rule of law compared to South Korea ranked 72nd, Tunisia 60th or 
Malaysia 65th .  
It is very difficult for new actors to enter into lucrative sectors. In 2006, Morocco 
ranked 47th in terms of regulatory quality while South Korea ranked 70th, Tunisia 58th and 
Malaysia 69th
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. 
All monetary incentives continued to benefit the established capitalists rather than to 
encourage new entrants, while weak growth and low productivity prevented the attainment of 
development targets. As a consequence, the majority of manufacturing industries grew at a 
rate slower than that of global trade. Their market share increases in declining industries as 
manufactured fertilizers or in slow-growing industries as equipment of for distribution of 
electricity. On the contrary, exports declined on fast-growing industries in the world like 
textile materials or leather and. In only very few industries, Morocco share grew faster than 
global trade (Finance ministry 2005). By and large, Moroccan growth was feeble from 1980 
to 2005 and the income per person progresses from 1831 to 2883 fixed PPP$ (high 
commission of plan 2008 www.hcp.ma). But, there is no convergence of income per person 
regarding European countries for instance. 
 
The impact of reforms on technological learning: learning stagnation. 
 
From the 1960s until now, Moroccan companies (either public or private) imported 
technologies in the form of equipment, turnkey plants and engineering. They supposed to be 
involved in a process of technological learning since that time. 
In 2007, we surveyed 21 large Moroccan companies (account for 4 percent of companies with 
more than 200 employees) to assess this process of technological learning. Our survey 
covered industries that account for 89 percent of employment, production and exports (agro 
foods, chemicals, refining, non-metal mineral manufactures, garment, textile, machinery and 
electric devices, metallurgy and metals manufactures). The survey shows that equipment 
importation is still the main source of technology and Moroccan companies acquire basic 
manufacturing capabilities through on-the-job training and technical assistance providing by 
the supplier. Few companies expanded their production facilities; a smaller percentage adapts 
technologies through their own engineering. A very small number of companies carries out 
R&D to innovate and keep pace with technology frontiers.  
Even innovative Moroccan companies, interact weakly with their customers and hardly bring 
production or design problems to domestic engineering and R&D structures. The technology 
suppliers are the main consultants in terms of equipment selection, projects design, plants 
installation and even R&D implementation. The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
behave similarly. According to the study of innovation performed by ‘R&D Maroc’ in 2005 
(Moroccan association that promotes innovation), SMEs sub-contracted 50 percent of their 
R&D and technology suppliers account for 47.2 percent of sub-contracting.  
Importations of equipment reach 6 billions constant $ in 2006 in comparison with 3 billons in 
2000  (Université de Sherbooke 2008 http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/statistiques/) 
while engineering importations reach 500 millions $ in 2000 (Kleiche 2000). 
On the other hand, TNCs confine their Moroccan subsidiaries to basic manufacturing 
tasks and provide them standards solutions for production and design problems.  
In short, interactive learning spaces in Morocco involve mainly domestic companies and 
foreign technology suppliers or parent-companies. Moroccan enterprises seem to generally 
stagnate at the level of basic manufacturing capabilities even if they have the human, financial 
and organizational resources to go through complex and innovative ones. 
Consequently, total factor productivity that reflects technical progress decreased by 
0,36 percent from 1971 to 2004 (Drissi 2007), whereas Moroccan companies with low 
productivity
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 (compared to the productivity mean of Moroccan companies) account for almost 
89 percent of SMEs and almost 78 percent of large ones. These low productivity companies 
account for almost a half of production, two third of exports and more than 75 percent of 
employment (Finance ministry 2007). In addition, the arrival of cheaper labour countries and 
damages Morocco’s competitiveness and performance in the global market.  
Historically, Moroccan capitalists were promoted by an authoritarian regime that 
garnered their support by giving them rents in protected areas. As defined by Khan (2006),  
rents are ‘incomes that individuals can earn that are higher than in their next-best opportunity 
and so rents exist if those in the next-best activities are prevented from getting access to 
particular resources or opportunities’. For instance, the nationalization of foreign companies 
in the 1970s (called Moroccanisation) benefited only from few rich families. Again, the 
privatization (promoted by reforms) of public companies in the 1980s and the 1990s rewarded 
the same capitalists and TNCs. These rent-seekers did not have the motivation to start new 
and risky businesses. Another example is the engineering sector where imports have been 
large from the 1960s onwards because dominant bureaucratic and economic rent-seekers 
prevent the domestic development (Germouni 1978). 
While the good governance agenda tried to cut this rent-seeking, by promoting 
intensive-labour industries or commodities, they simultaneously prevented technological 
learning. Companies saw their interest in exploiting natural resources or cheap labour without 
the need to improve either products or processes. Also, the gospel of efficiency discouraged 
companies from upgrading their technological capabilities for the following reason. Moroccan 
companies were cost-competitive in short-run; therefore, efficiency required them to focus on 
markets where they could sell their products at the right price. However, this strategy was not 
competitive in long-run because their capabilities did not change to match new market needs 
and technology changes. Moreover, The lack of trust lead to the lack of interactions between 
actors and prevents technological learning and dissemination. Innovative companies in 
Morocco seem like competitive islands disconnected from the majority of vulnerable 
companies.  
On the other hand, the government does not provide the necessary resources to the 
companies as facilities, funding, information, qualified workers or bargaining power to 
improve their capabilities. For instance, the WB claimed that an emphasis on primary 
education and a bigger role of private sector would make the educational system more 
efficient. However, the enrolment in secondary and tertiary education continued to increase 
whereas the system had lower means and the private expenditures did not substitute public 
ones (Benlahcen Tlemçani, 1997). Thus, the educational system is currently unable to train 
more people with appropriate skills regarding the new competitive context. The labour force 
is widely unqualified and unemployed people are young and qualified. For instance, working 
persons without any education accounts for 70.5 percent of total working persons while those 
with tertiary education account for 8.5 percent. Unemployed persons with tertiary education 
account for 26.8 percent of total unemployed persons while those without any education 
account for 5.2 percent (HCP 2008 www.hcp.ma). 
In summary, the reforms did not encourage the emergence of the interactive learning 
spaces and the upgrading of Moroccan technological capabilities. The big concentration of 
outputs and exports in low technology industries expose Morocco to loose competitiveness. 
As a result, Morocco’s growth is still low and dependent on exogenous factors such as the 
rain, the phosphate or foodstuffs prices. 
 
 
IV. TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING AS A REFORM OBJECTIVE 
 
It is clear that Morocco will not be competitive in low technology/ value-added industries 
because the real wages increase and cheaper countries walk off with customers. Moroccan 
companies can survive only if they become more creative and innovative. Sustainable growth 
can be achieved by moving into new specific areas where Moroccan companies can have a 
comparative advantage on the basis of higher value-added products and services. However, to 
reach this new competitiveness, Morocco must implement reforms and policies that lead to an 
appropriate institutional framework and then to the upgrading of technological capabilities. In 
our opinion, the role of the State is undeniable in the transformation of Moroccan economy. 
Next, we argue that Moroccan State have to acquire growth-enhancing governance and set up 
specific management of technological catch-up. 
 
4.1 State efficiency versus Market efficiency: 
The success of some Asian countries has to be contrasted with the failure of most of 
developing countries where the State was the main culprit for resource waste. But, in our 
opinion, the market-liberal consensus and its reforms did not address critical problems of the 
technological catching-up and sustainable growth. According to Khan’s (2006) study of the 
governance indicators in high-growth and low-growth developing countries, the market-
enhancing governance is not significantly better in the first group. In addition, the data 
suggest a very weak positive correlation between the quality of market-promoting governance 
and economic growth. 
The Moroccan State, as most of developing countries, cannot manage the 
technological and economic development because of structural failures. First, a weak fiscal 
system puts limits on public resources. In Morocco, fiscal system is not reliable and most 
actors are of low productivity and cannot even pay for their own protection. Second, 
achieving the necessary political stability for investment, growth and accumulation in 
strategic sectors requires resources that do not exist in the budget. Consequently, the State 
must maintain weak and contested property rights to achieve non-market asset transfers 
(allocate land to specific groups or use the right of “expropriation” for infrastructures and 
productive facilities).  
But, managing political stability and non-markets asset transfers could generate 
political corruption and clientelism. In contrast, developed countries carry out costly 
protection of property rights because the fiscal system is reliable and very productive actors 
pay taxes and private expenditures to protect their interests
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. 
Successful developing and even developed countries actually did not eliminate the 
rent-seeking behaviours; they only managed them to not waste resources and made these 
behaviours more productive. For instance, South Korean centralized government transferred 
in the 1960s public resources to private entrepreneurs to build Chaebols. But, failing 
companies could not buy protection and continue to take advantage of these assets. The 
Chinese government transferred public assets to private company to enhance competition and 
upgrade telecommunications networks and services in the 1990s. The government continues 
to call companies to order if they do not follow instructions. (El Fakir 2008 and El Fakir 
2007). 
In summary, current opportunities and pressures require an efficient Moroccan State that set 
up institutional framework according to pre-existent political structure to: 
 Maintain political stability. 
 Involve the State and the majority of the population in the development process5. 
 Manage and make rent-seeking behavior in favor of productive activities.  
 Transfer assets and property rights from unproductive to productive groups. 
 
4.2 Management of technological catch-up: 
Technological learning is costly and risky. Companies have to invest in new equipment, train 
their employees or conduct R&D projects while changes speed up. If there are no incentives 
to carry out these investments, companies prefer to avoid them. Markets do not necessarily 
provide these incentives especially for the long-run competitiveness. This is the role of the 
State through its industrial and technological policies.  
As we saw, thanks to the State interventions, Korean, Chinese, Singaporean or Indian 
firms go deliberately in many ILSs that involved diverse actors (suppliers, clients, R&D 
structures, TNCs and so on) in dynamic industries and new technologies that provide 
windows of opportunity with large prospects for learning and growth.  
In Morocco, companies have little incentives to achieve the costly and risky technological 
learning for two reasons. First, they avoid investment because of the structural failures (lack 
of trust, unproductive rent-seeking behaviour). Second, they do not have the requisite 
resources (information, skills, funding and bargaining power) to choose, acquire and 
assimilate the right technologies.  
The rent-seeking behaviour is actually very rational. Capitalists try to invest in 
profitable activities preferably without competitors. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs innovate to 
have a monopoly’s rent for a while. The problem is that, in Morocco, the rent is achieved by 
unproductive groups thanks to the links with the regime not to the efforts of innovation. They 
simply withdraw precious resources from the majority. In addition, the companies do not have 
enough information about new and even mature technologies to choose the right one. Finally, 
some suffer from the lack of qualified and productive workers because of educational system 
failures.  
Markets direct capital to low value-added /technology sectors that have already 
achieved competitiveness (or in which productivity gap does not matter) instead of high 
value-added  sectors because requisite skills, facilities and spillovers are not available. 
Therefore, Moroccan industrial and technological policies must encourage companies to go 
into interactive learning spaces through: 
 Evolutionary policies establishing priorities and supporting technological learning in 
each stage; 
 Clear compulsions and objectives that prevent wasting resources; 
 Technology-watch in order to provide information about technological options and 
strategic activities; 
 Learning and innovation rents (subsidies and incentives) to encourage strategic 
activities, interactions between actors, dissemination of technologies and generation of 
positive spillovers; and  Long-term investment in education, research and 
infrastructure to consolidate learning skills in strategic areas. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Some of the developing countries that did not follow the liberalization reforms achieved 
higher levels of accumulation, productivity and sustainable growth. Countries that spent their 
time and effort to improve markets efficiency were less successful.  
By and large, reforms proposed by the international institutions tend to be normative, 
promoting the applications of “best practices” derived from advanced countries to developing 
countries. But, these practices are considered as the best “ex post”. In others words, these 
institutions decree what normally must be applied in developing countries based on 
experiments that are not reproducible. The normative aspect of reforms leads to two 
difficulties. First, these reforms are basically exogenous and do not address local concerns. 
Second, to enforce exogenous norms, they must be fully embraced by the majority or imposed 
by force. 
But, the technological and industrial successes of emerging countries are closely 
related to the institutional and political framework that made technological learning sustained. 
Markets are mostly inefficient because of structural characteristics of these countries. The 
success of these countries is rooted in requires governance capabilities that ensure 
technological learning regarding the most appropriate window of opportunities and regarding 
specificities of each country. But, many questions remain unanswered especially how the 
State changes into a promoter of productive groups and how unproductive rent-seekers 
capitulate. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Paris Club is an informal group of financial officials representing public lenders from the 19 
richest countries. London Club is the corresponding informal group of private creditors. 
2
 Rule of law indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Regulatory quality indicator measures the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development The percentile rank (0-100) indicates rank of country among 212 countries. 0 
corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest one. 
                                                                                                                                                        
World Bank development indicators database. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp 
And Ould-Aoudia (2006). 
3
 Productivity is measured by the ration added value/number of workers in all Moroccan companies 
between 1986 and 2003. 
4
 Property rights protection costs are part of the transaction costs that may account for as much as half 
of all economic activity (Khan 2006. p. 33). 
5
 A study of  Ould Aoudia and Mesiel (2007) of high-growth developing countries shows that they 
were successful because the development was a priority for the elite and there was a dialogue to strive 
towards the general interest. 
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